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THE NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
landlord's agreement to repair. The plaintiff was nonsuited, the
court holding that the damages were too remote and not within the
contemplation of the parties.
JULE MCMICHAEL.
Registration-Similarity In Name As Notice.
On petition for the recognition of mortgagee's claim as a lien
against the funds of the mortgagor's trustee in bankruptcy, held,
where the mortgagor's creditors knew that it had conducted a flying
school under the name of "Greer College of Motoring," a mortgage
so recorded was constructive notice of a lien against "Greer College
and Airways." And had the creditors not had such information, they
would have been presumed to know that flying machines require
motors.1
Most courts strictly construe the recordation statutes. When the
Christian name is wrong,2 or omitted,3 the record is said not to be
notice. On the other hand, omission of the first name and substitution
of the middle name is held fatal by some courts4 and immaterial by
others.5 In the case of common diminutives and corruptions of
proper names, the almost universal view is that the searcher is given
sufficient notice. 6 It is also held in the use of the proper initial for
'In re Greer College and Airways, 53 F. (2d) 585 (C. C. A. 7th, 1931). The
other ground for the decision was that under an existing Illinois statute which
required several steps in the process of change of corporate name, the name had
not in fact been changed until the final step.
' Zimmerman v. Briggans, 5 Watts 186 (Pa. 1836); Stark v. Weisner, 214
N. Y. Supp. 292 (1926) ; Bankers' Loan and Investment Co. v. Blair, 99 Va.
606, 39 S. E. 213 (1901); Zimmer v. Dunlap, 99 N. J. Eq. 610, 133 Atl. 514
(1926) ; Bernstein v. Schoenfeld, 81 N. Y. Supp. 11 (1902). Contra: Ouimert
v. Sirous, 124 Mass. 162 (1877) (Joseph Cyr, sufficient notice to one searching
for Germain Sirous: decision due to Massachusetts doctrine that things good
between parties are good as to third persons).
3 Ridgway's Appeal, 15 Pa. 177 (1850); Richardson v. Gardner, 128 Va. 676,
105 S. E. 225 (1920).
'Johnson v. Hess, 126 Ind. 298, 25 N. E. 445 (1890) (William not notice to
one looking for Henry W.) ; Haring v. Murphy, 113 N. Y. Supp. 452 (1903).
'Loser v. Plainfield, 149 Iowa 672, 128 N. W. 1101 (1910) ; Jenny v. Zehn-
der, 101 Pa. 296 (1882) (F. Zehnter, notice of John Jacob Frederick Zehnder).
"H. R. & Co. v. Smith, 208 N. Y. Supp. 396, 151 N. E. 448 (1926) (Bess and
Elizabeth); Burns v. Ross, 215 Pa. 293, 64 Atl. 526 (1910) (Frank and
Francis) ; Goodell v. Hall, 112 Ga. 435, 37 S. E. 725 (1900) (Elizabeth and
Eliza) ; Styles v. Theo. P. Scotland and Co., 22 N. D. 469, 134 S. W. 708
(1912) (Charles and Charlie) ; Fallon v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. 44 (1869) (Darby and
Jeremiah). Contra: Thomas v. Desney, 57 Iowa 58, 10 N. W. 315 (1881)
(Helen and Ellen) ; Zimmerman v. Briggans, supra note 2 (John and Jacob) ;
Thornily v. Prentice, 121 Iowa 89, 96 N. W. 728 (1903) (Willis and Wiliam).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
the Christian name,7 or where the first and middle names are trans-
posed,8 that a person should be put on inquiry. But where the initial
is wrong 9 the variance destroys the effect of the record as notice;
although some courts have gone to the extreme of holding two wrong
initials immaterial.' 0
Due to increased modern usage, the weight of authority now holds
a mistake in the middle initial,1 ' or its omission,12 to defeat the
record. A cursory glance at the city directory will convince one of
the wisdom of such change. However, other courts still cling to the
common law doctrine that the law recognizes but one Christian
name.' 3 Then again, a superfluous initial,14 or the first and second 15
or second and third transposed,16 prevents the creation of a lien.
As a rule an erroneous or faulty surname will not be coun-
tenanced' 7 save where the doctrine of idem sonans is applied.' 8 Other
" Stark v. Lamberton, 282 Pa. 219, 127 Atl. 631 (1925) ; Jones' Estate, 27
Pa. 336 (1856); Green v. Meyer, 98 Mo. App. 438, 72 S. W. 128 (1903);
Stephenson v. Cone, 24 S. D. 460, 124 N. W. 439 (1910) ; Pinney v. Russell &
Co., 52 Minn. 443, 54 N. W. 484 (1893).
'Huston v. Seeley, 27 Iowa 190 (1869) ; Hauser v. Calloway, 36 F. (2d) 667
(C. C. A. 8th, 1929).9Johnson v. Wilson & Co., 37 Ala. 468, 34 So. 392 (1903); Prouty v.
Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 74 At. 550 (1909); Lemm v. Kramer, .224 S. W. 560
(Tex. Civ. App. 1920) ; Aultman v. Ward, 50 Neb. 442, 69 N. W. 935 (1897).
' 0Brayton v. Beall, 73 S. C. 308, 53 S. E. 641 (1906). Contra: Lemm v.
Kramer, supra note 9; Windle v. Citizen's National Bank, 280 Mo. 268, 216
S. W. 1020 (1919).
'Dutton v. Simmons, 65 Me. 583 (1873); Allen West Commission Co. v.
Millstead, 92 Miss. 837, 46 So. 256 (1908) ; Delaney v. Becker, 14 Pa. Super.
Ct. 392 (1900) ; Turk v. Benson, 30 N. D. 200, 152 N. W. 354 (1915).
Crouse v. Murphey, 140 Pa. 335, 21 AtL. 358 (1891) ; Woods v. Reynolds,
7 W. & S. 406 (Pa. 1844) ; Insurance Co. v. Halpern, 263 Pa. 155, 117 Atl. 197
(1922) ; Davis v. Steeps, 87 Wis. 472, 58 N. W. 769 (1894).
Fincher v. Hanegan, 59 Ark. 151, 26 S. W. 821 (1894) ; Jones v. Berkshire,
15 Iowa 248 (1863); Butts v. Cruttenden, 14 Pa. Super. Ct. 449 (1900);
Gillespie v. Rogers, 146 Mass. 612, 16 N. E. 711 (1888).
14 Stone v. Threefoot Bros. & Co., 99 Miss. 15, 54 So. 595 (1911).
SWindle v. Citizen's National Bank, supra note 10. Contra: Huston v.
Seeley, supra note 8 (J. A. is notice to one looking for Almira J.) ; Hauser v.
Calloway, supra note 8 (Chester C. Calloway notice of lien against Charles
Chester Calloway).
"°Wicker v. Jenkins, 49 Tex. Civ. App. 366, 108 S. W. 188 (1900) (variance
between W. F. B. Wicker and W. B. F. Wicker is fatal).
17 Buchan v. Sumner, 2 Barb. Ch. 165 (N. Y. 1847) (judgment docketed as
Sumner Palmer was not notice of Palmer Sumner) ; Lembeck & Betz Brewing
Co. v. Barbi, 90 N. J. Eq. 373, 106 Atl. 552 (1919) (Barbi was not notice of
Borbely, although signature on mortgage was Barbily and Bourbi) ; Mackey v.
Cole, 79 Wis. 426, 48 N. W. 520 (1891) ; Howe v. Thayer, 49 Iowa 154 (1878)
(Wm. H. Freeman does not create lien on Wm. H. Furman). Contra: Ouimert
V. Sirous, supra note 2.
' Green v. Myers, supra note 7 (Seibert same as Sibert. "It is com-
mon knowledge that names are spelled a variety of ways and everyone is pre-
sumed to have such knowledge"). Myer v. Fegaly, 39 Pa. 429 (1861) (Bubb
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courts, taking the more rational view, refuse to apply the rule1 9 and
hold that the record is notice to the eye and not to the ear. But where
two names, though idem sonans, begin with different letters the inac-
curacy is held by both sides to be material.
20
Admittedly the majority of the courts, in the case of mortgages,
permit some variance, but a variance on a judgment docket is gen-
erally fatal. Even in the case of mortgages the variance permitted is
slight and often excused on the ground that the person is well known
by both names, 2 ' or both are similar in a particular dialect.2 2 Usually,
however, the record is not to be construed in the light of extraneous
matter.
2 3
One is impressed by the almost total lack of cases dealing with
corporate names imprecisely recorded. But in those found, the view
taken is diametrically opposed to that of the principal case.
24
In North Carolina, the court has taken a liberal attitude where the
question of variance has arisen. When a variance occurs in the index,
and Bobb); Muehlenger v. Schilling, 3 N. Y. Supp. 705 (1888) (Schelleng and
Schilling); Miltonvale State Bank v. Kuhnle, 50 Kan. 420, 31 Pac. 1057 (1893)
(Johnston and Johnson) ; Howard v. Turbell, 179 Ind. 67, 100 N. E. 372 (1913)
(Blunt and Blount); Bergman's Appeal, 88 Pa. 120 (1878) (Heckman and
Hackman; eye is naturally directed to names slightly different) ; Bates v. State
Bank, 7 Ark. 394 (1847) (Asher and Ashley).
"'Berkowitz v. Dam, 202 N. Y. Supp. 584 (1923) (Sorcher and Soicher);
Stark v. Weisner, supra note 2 (Weisner v. Wiesner) ; Aetna Life Insur-
ance Co. v. Hesser, 77 Iowa 381, 42 N. W. 325 (1889) (Hesser and Hesse).
' Boyd v. Boyd, 128 Iowa 699, 104 N. W. 798 (1905) (Sheffey and
Cheffey); Heil's Appeal, 40 Pa. 453 (1861) (Yoest and Joest); Clary v.
O'Shea, 72 Minn. 105, 75 N. W. 115 (1898) (John O'Shea and John 0. Shea).
Contra: Fallon v. Kehoe, 38 Cal. 44 (1869) (Jeremiah Fallon and Darby
O'Fallon).
' Brayton v. Beall, supra note 10; Ouimert v. Sirous, supra note 2; Fallon
v. Kehoe, supra. note 6; Jenny v. Zehnder, supra note 5; Huston v. Seeley,
supra note 8; Hauser v. Calloway, supra note 8.
' Muehlenger v. Schilling, supra note 18 (both names have the same sound
in German) ; Meyer v. Fegaly, supra note 18 (same sound in German; criterion
is that the notice to be sufficient must advise a person of ordinary intelligence).
Contra: Zimmer v. Dunlap, supra note 2 (Guiseppe, Italian for Joseph) ; Heil's
Appeal, supra note 20 ("Law does not impose duty on the searcher to inquire
whether other letters, in another language, may not spell the same name.").
'Grundies v. Reid, 107 Ill. 304 (1883) ("Constructive notice flowing ex-
clusively from matters of record can never be construed to be more extensive
or broader than the facts stated in the record.") ; Zimmerman v. Briggans,
supra note 2 ("Subsequent creditors are not bound to go beyond the judgment
docket.") ; Prouty v. Marshall, supra note 9; Thomas v. Desney, supra note 6;
Boyd v. Boyd, supra note 20.
2 McLarry v. Studebaker Bros. Co. of Texas, 146 S. W. 676 (Tex. Civ. App.
1912) (record of Studebaker Bros. of Texas is not notice of lien against Stude-
baker Bros.) ; Congregational Free Church Bldg. Society v. Scandinavian Free
Church of Tacoma, 24 Wash. 433, 64 Pac. 750 (1901). (Scandinavian Congre-
gational Church is not notice of Scandinavian Free Church) ; Spreyne v. Gar-
field Lodge No. 1, 117 Ill. App. 253 (1904).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
a searcher is affected with all the knowledge that inquiry into the
record would have revealed.25
The principal case seems to have gone too far. It proposes to
reward the searcher in proportion to his ability to imply. And
strangely enough, there is good authority in Illinois to the contrary. 26
In addition, the purpose of the recording statutes is to give con-
structive notice of a lien and not prima facie evidence of one. The
likelihood of fraud and the insecurity which would arise under too
liberal a view, is exactly what the statutes were passed to prevent.
On its facts, it is believed that the instant case was correctly decided.
Actually, no rights of a third party had intervened.
CECILE L. PILTZ.
Usury-Deduction of Expenses Incidental to the Loan.
In addition to the maximum legal rate of interest plaintiff building
and loan association deducted two per cent from the loan to cover cost
of investigating the borrower's credit. Held, not a scheme to evade
the usury statutes, since there was no evidence to contradict the con-
tention that the amount charged was actually expended in a bona fide
way as compensation for the services rendered.'
It is generally conceded that deduction by the lender for expenses
and services incidental to the loan does not render the transaction
usurious even though the total amount received exceeds the legal
interest rate.2 This is true whether the expenses are already in-
" Royster v. Lane, 118 N. C. 156, 245 S. E. 796 (1896) ; Valentine v. Har-
rison, 193 N. C. 825, 138 S. E. 308 (1927) ; West v. Jackson, 198 N. C. 693, 153
S. E. 257 (1930) (the question is whether a careful searcher would be put upon
inquiry).
' Grundies v. Reid, supra note 23; Kennedy v. Merriam, 70 Ill. 228 (1873);
Garrison v. People, 21 Ill. 535 (1859) ; Spreyne v. Garfield Lodge No. 1, supra
note 24 (charter granted to United Slavonian Benevolent Society does not tend
to prove the corporate existence of Garfield Lodge No. 1 of United Slavonian
Benevolent Society).
' Taylor v. Consolidated Loan and Savings Co., 162 S. E. 391 (Ga. App.
1932).
' Iowa Savings and Loan Association v. Heidt, 107 Iowa 297, 77 N. W. 1050,
70 Am. St. Rep. 197, 43 L. R. A. 689 (1899) (expenses incurred by lender in
recording the mortgage, procuring the abstract, and examining the title);
Ashland National Bank v. Conley, 231 Ky. 844, 22 S. W. (2d) 270 (1929)
(examining title, procuring insurance, and appraising property). Note (1921)
21 A. L. R. 797; Note (1927) 53 A. L. R. 743; Note (1928) 63 A. L. P.
823. Deduction of expenses incidental to the loan has statutory recognition in
North Carolina as to building and loan associations and land and loan asso-
ciations. Building and loan: N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §5183; land and
loan: N. C. CODE ANN. (Michie, 1931) §5207 (h). There seems to be no such
provision for savings and loan associations.
